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Putting Citizens First:
Representation and Power
in the European Union
The European Union’s 2007 Intergovernmental Conferences in Brussels and Lisbon
agreed on a new composition of the European Parliament, and on a new voting system
for the Council of Ministers. For the legislative period 2009–2014, the seats of the
European Parliament are assigned to the 27 Member States following a proposal of the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, plus one additional seat for Italy, here referred
to as the “AFCO + 1” seat allocation.1 Starting in 2014, the Council of Ministers will
use a “Double Majority” voting system, whereby an act is adopted if carried by at least
55 percent of the Member States representing 65 percent of the Union’s population.
The resolution of the European Parliament (2007) draws attention to the overall
reform package for the Union’s institutions and demands that a future reform should
at all events correct any inequalities which have arisen for historical reasons. As a
contribution to the prospective debate we here discuss two citizen-based procedures, a
“Fix + Prop.” seat apportionment for the European Parliament, and the “Jagiellonian
Compromise” voting system for the Council of Ministers. A shift to the envisioned
citizen-based procedures turns out to go along with a surprisingly balanced compensation
of weights, between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
1. Introduction
Parliamentary representation systems and governmental decision schemes are always
subject to debate and reform. They should permit efficient political operations and,
in modern democracies, they should stay close to the citizens. As a recent review of
the new Scottish Parliament puts it, the issue is to place the citizens at the center of
concerns (Arbuthnott, 2006).
1 In EU parlance, the Committee is called the AFCO (affairs constitutionnelles) Committee.
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The present paper is written under the premise that in the European Union, too,
citizens should come first. For the European Union this is more of a daring assumption
than an undisputed fact (Moberg, 2007). After all, the European Community and
its forerunners started out as a union of states which, in turn, were represented by
their governments, without assigning an institutional role to citizens. We justify our
premise by the belief that this has changed. The 2007 Intergovernmental Conferences,
in conjunction with the actions of the European Parliament, have made considerable
progress in incorporating citizens into the political process of the Union. Yet, as we
aim to show in this paper, there is room for further improvement.
When the citizens are taken to be the reference set, a central question is which data base
to use. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs emphasized that this poses a problem
urgently needing attention (Section 2). In proposing its seat allocation, the Committee
relied on a “degressive proportionality” concept that, unfortunately, does not stand up
to mathematical scrutiny. The concept happens to apply to the population data the
Committee chose to work with, but fails with other data. Degressive proportionality,
as defined by the Committee and Parliament, is an inept concept that is inappropriate
to serve as a court-proof standard of orientation (Section 3).
Section 4 shows that such notions as degressive proportionality, when interpreted in
a broad sense, can be served better. We favor an allocation of parliamentary seats
that guarantees each Member State’s citizenry a fixed base of seats and apportions
the remaining seats by applying the one-person-one-vote principle to the Union’s
citizenry at large. A particular such method, called the Fix + Prop. apportionment,
is described in greater detail. It assigns 6 fixed seats to each Member State’s citizenry,
and apportions the remaining 589 seats in proportion to populations subject to a ceiling
of 96 seats. Alternative variants are outlined in the Appendix. We also record how the
AFCO + 1 seat allocation deviates from the citizen-based Fix + Prop. apportionment.
Section 5 deals with voting systems for the Council of Ministers. We first explain the
workings of the distinguished citizen-based system that is known as the Jagiellonian
Compromise. Then we calculate the deviation of each Member State’s decision power,
between the decreed Double Majority voting system and the envisioned citizen-based
Jagiellonian Compromise. It so happens that, for a vast majority of Member States, the
seat deviations in Parliament outweigh fairly well the power deviations in the Council.
We conclude (Section 6) that a shift to citizen-based procedures, besides accommo-
dating the democratic motto of putting citizens first, corrects some of the inequalities
which have arisen for historical reasons, and does so in a surprisingly balanced fashion.
Admittedly the details hinge on exactly which constraints the Union’s institutions will
set: Which population data will be used? Is the European Parliament’s house size
to stay at 751, or will it revert to 750? Does the above Fix + Prop. apportionment
method meet with approval, or is a variant to be preferred?
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2. The inception of an apportionment population
In the document submitted to the plenary session (Lamassoure/Severin, 2007a), the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs stressed the currently insufficient harmonization
of the concept of citizenship between the Member States. As time was too short to
solve the problem, the Committee agreed to refer for once to the population figures
used for qualified majority decisions in the Council of Ministers (Steinmeier, 2007).
In the long run the apportionment population needs to be reconsidered and properly
defined, whether derived from European citizens, nationals, residents, or voters.
In the United States of America, with more than two centuries of constitutional history,
plenty of cases have been brought before the Supreme Court to decide whom to count,
or not to count, among the “apportionment population” used to apportion the 435
seats of the House of Representatives among the 50 US States. No matter which
definition the European Union chooses to adopt, time is needed for EuroStat and 27
national statistical offices to provide the relevant figures. Therefore the Committee on
Constitutional Affairs is to be commended that it acted instantly by initiating a report
to address the question, with Andrew Duff MEP appointed rapporteur, rather than
letting the issue rest until a new Parliament will convene in 2009.
Indeed, we would like to voice some concern about the use of the population figures from
Steinmeier (2007). They are given in multiples of a hundred, which the Committee on
Constitutional Affairs rounds yet further to the nearest thousand. These aggregation
steps deprive citizens of their individuality. The legislator views the numbers with
the contemptuous eyes of a field marshal who counts his troops only in cohorts of a
hundred (for the Council), or in legions of a thousand (for Parliament). The question is
not whether 404 346 is a more accurate count for Malta than 404 000, but which figure
sends the enlightening message to citizens that, as individual human beings, they are
counted one by one.
Moreover, a source of error mentioned in passing only are double counts of citizens
who are voting in one state while simultaneously being counted into the population
of another. When the rapporteurs Alain Lamassoure MEP and Adrian Severin MEP
(2007b) present the Committee’s report to the press, the final question is posed by an
Italian journalist asking whether the numbers of people eligible to vote in the 2004
European Parliament election would have provided a more appropriate basis. The
rapporteurs’ impatient, if not unwilling answer is that Parliament represents not only
the electorate, but also children. Every community treasures children, of course, but
they hardly explain the visible statistical inconsistencies.
Luxembourg provides a telling example. In 2004 they had an electorate of 214 318,
while EuroStat gives a population of 304 283 for that year. The rapporteurs’ reasoning
would imply that close to a third of Luxembourg’s population are children and minors.
Plenty of double counts may explain the discrepancy more plausibly (Hovehne, 1999,
p. 310). Part of the rapporteurs’ unwillingness may have been fueled by the fact that
France is ranked second and Italy fourth using the Council’s population data (see
Exhibit 1) whereas, on the basis of the 2004 electorate (Scheffler, 2005), France drops
to rank four and Italy advances to rank two. This only indicates in yet another way
how sensitive an issue the definition of an apportionment population will be.
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3. The sudden death of AFCO-degressivity
Degressivity of some sort or other, of weights, power, and representation, has been
around since the early days of the Union, without a general and lasting definition
(Moberg, 2002, 2007). The European Parliament now sees itself called upon to spell out
the principle of degressive proportionality clearly and objectively. Since the term has
become a principle of primary law, violation of this principle in secondary legislation
might even result in penalization by the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs proposes a definition that dissects degressive
proportionality into three items, forming Article 1 of the draft decision of the European
Council (European Parliament, 2007), as follows.
(1) The minimum threshold of 6 seats and the maximum allocation of 96 seats
per Member State must be fully utilized to ensure that the seat apportionment
reflects as closely as possible the range of populations of the Member States.
(2) The larger the population of a Member State, the greater its entitlement to a
large number of seats.
(3) The larger the population of a Member State, the more inhabitants are
represented by each of its Members of the European Parliament.
Item (1) is stronger than what is demanded by Article I-20 of the Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe (Pukelsheim, 2007). There, minimum and maximum
restrictions are taken to specify a range from 6 to 96 seats wherein the seat numbers
have to come to lie. Here, the limits must be utilized. The justification given is void.
Utilization of the limits does not ensure, in any provable sense, that the apportionment
reflects the populations more closely than when not using the limits. Actually, with
the accession of a big country like Turkey any sensible apportionment of 751 seats stays
well below the maximum of 96 should a minimum of six persist. For the present Union,
the weak version of the old Article I-20 performs just as well as the new item (1); the
demand that limits be utilized is superfluous, but does not do any harm either.
Item (2) is called weak population monotonicity in the literature (Balinski/Young,
1982a, p. 147). The property is so self-evident that a seat allocation that does not
comply is called absurd (Kopfermann, 1991, p. 95). Nobody would want to seriously
propose a proportional representation scheme for the European Parliament whereby of
two states the less populous state is awarded more seats than the more populous state.
With item (1) superfluous and item (2) self-evident, the heart of the definition is item
(3) which we name “AFCO-degressivity”. It stipulates that the population-per-seat
ratios must be strictly decreasing when passing from larger to smaller Member States.
Annex 1 of the Committee’s report shows that the AFCO allocation of the originally
750 seats verifies the criterion, as do other propositions (Chopin/Jamet, 2007).
However, during the European Council in Lisbon the Heads of State and Government
granted an extra seat to Italy, thus putting a premature end to AFCO-degressivity.
Any Italian deputy now represents 804 818 citizens among 59 million, while Spanish
deputies stand for more citizens, 810 339, out of only 44 million; see Exhibit 1. The
sudden death of AFCO-degressivity through Council’s action resembles a soccer game
where the other team scores the deciding goal right in the first few seconds of overtime.
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Even more fatal is the finding that there exist situations where AFCO-degressivity
makes no headway at all. At times there simply do not exist any seat apportionments
satisfying the criterion. This was brought to light by Victoriano Ramı´rez-Gonza´lez,
and he illustrates the insufficiency by example in his contribution to this Proceedings
volume. The reason for the non-existence degeneration is that items (1)–(3) may be
incompatible. For instance, 163 seats must be apportioned in such a way that every
state gets a minimum of six seats—by (1), thus taking care of 162 seats—and that the
163rd seat is assigned to the largest state, Germany, by (2). The population-per-seat
ratio of Germany stays above that of France, so AFCO-degressivity (3) comes for free.
However, there is no room to allocate a 164th seat. By (2), it could go only to Germany
or else to France. Either way AFCO-degressivity is violated.2
How can it happen for the Committee to maneuver itself into a dead-end road? It
may come along with the self-satisfaction to steer clear of any mathematical formula.
The fact that AFCO-degressivity cannot be found anywhere in the scientific literature
should have been a cause for suspicion, not pride. As Parliament comprises only
whole seats and no seat fractions, final calculations must always be rounded to whole
numbers. This rounding step needs to be accounted for, whether proportionality is
strict or degressive. Failing to do so, AFCO-degressivity must be dismissed.
The Committee pays attention when describing full proportionality (Lamassoure/
Severin, 2007a, Explanatory Statement, no. 13): The population-per-seat ratios should
be the same (or very close) in all Member States, whence any seat represents more
or less the same number of inhabitants. These caveats are to the point. Intermediate
results must inevitably be rounded to obtain whole seat numbers, and for this reason
the ratios cannot be exactly the same, but only more or less so. The Committee admits
no provisos at all, however, when turning to degressive proportionality. Rather than
admitting population-per-seat ratios to be decreasing “more or less” or the like, any
non-decreasing instance is considered a clear breach of degressive proportionality. This
rigidness causes AFCO-degressivity on occasion to become non-workable.
For the electoral debate to acquire a genuine European dimension, the resolution
(European Parliament, 2007, no. 17) proposes to encourage the formation of a
European party system. But political parties are formed by citizens, not by
Member States. This author fears that any degressivity of whatever sort must be
counterproductive, by breaking the European dimension into a spectrum of 27 lines
of degressive national valencies. If Parliament demonstrates to the citizens that it
considers them not to be equal, how could this be an incentive for them to collectively
campaign for political goals?
2 If Germany gets the 164th seat, then she has eight seats and her population-per-seat ratio
(82 438 000/8 = 10 304 750) falls below that of France (62 886 200/6 = 10 481 033). If France
gets the 164th seat, then she has seven seats and her population-per-seat ratio (62 886 200/7 =
8 983 743) falls below that of the United Kingdom (60 421 900/6 = 10 070 316).
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For lack of precedence we can only speculate which stance the Court of Justice would
take. It seems unlikely that AFCO-degressivity, applying once but not for all, will
acquire a lasting legal status. Presumably the Court would not completely run counter
to how its fellow courts in the Member States deal with electoral matters. The German
Federal Constitutional Court requires an apportionment method to be transparent,
calculable, and abstract-general (Pukelsheim/Maier, 2006). The AFCO + 1 allocation
misses out on all three requirements, or so we believe. It is not transparent, since it
starts out from the Nice negotiations where in the final hours the Presidency handed out
seats like loose change (Gray and Stubb, 2001) to get a deal. It is not calculable since,
besides securing AFCO-degressivity, the sixteen seats beyond Nice were allocated by
higher insight of a Committee majority. And it is concrete-specific and not abstract-
general, since it applies to the data at hand and not in general.
But then there is also a continuity principle in electoral matters that shields the
legislator from having to blindly follow an abstract rule when the concrete situation
calls for a more sensitive action. In a period where its institutional role is changing,
the European Parliament used its margin of discretion to adopt a system that, while
debatable, certainly goes in the right direction. Therefore, if the Court of Justice were
to declare the AFCO + 1 seat allocation to be unlawful, it would do so presumably
not ex tunc (since inception), but ex nunc (from now on) calling upon Parliament
to ameliorate their system before the next election. To this end, however, no court
is needed. All speakers in the debate emphasized that the present resolution needs
reconsideration during the next legislative period (European Parliament, 2007).
4. The Fix + Prop. seat apportionment
There are plenty of apportionment formulas reconciling the implicit goals lurking
behind the composition of the European Parliament. All of them put a strain of
some sort or other on the status quo, since none seems to reproduce the AFCO + 1
allocation or the Nice or other former seat assignments. In time, when the goals will
become more explicit, the abundance of formulas will undoubtedly narrow down. Here
we present what we consider a prototype method, the Fix + Prop. apportionment.
Article I-1 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe introduces two groups
of constitutional subjects of the Union, the citizens and the States of Europe. The
question is whether, and how, the two groups are to be represented in Parliament.
When the rapporteur Adrian Severin MEP remarks that we, the European Parliament,
are representative of citizens and of the states at the same time, the minutes record
murmurs of dissent, the only emotional reaction during the plenum debate other than
applause. Perhaps the dissent questions whether or not Parliament is representative
of the governments of the states. In contrast, the debate clearly indicates that the
Members of the European Parliament see themselves representing the citizenry, as a
whole, of their home state. In fact, this is a strong point in each speech.
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To start, the Fix + Prop. apportionment assigns six seats to the citizenry of each of
the 27 Member States, thus allocating 162 seats. This implements the principle of
plurality, by allowing the main constituents of the spectrum of the political opinion in
each Member State—particularly the majority and the opposition—to be represented
(European Parliament, 2007, no. 5). There are many electoral systems guaranteeing a
certain number of seats in order to secure a minimum representation. France has a one
seat minimum per De´partement in the Assemble´e nationale. Spanish provinces send at
least two deputies to the Congreso de los Diputados. Two is a frequent minimum since,
in addition to a first seat for the government majority, a sufficiently strong opposition
minority might win the second seat. By way of comparison a minimum of six seats
sounds excessive, to this author, but seems generally accepted in Parliament.
To finish, the Fix + Prop. method apportions the remaining seats (589) observing the
one-person-one-vote principle. In our prototype version we use the divisor method
with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague¨) which, as is shown by the seminal
research of Balinski/Young (1982a, 1982b), excellently conforms with the philosophy of
proportional representation. With the current data, population figures are divided by
the common divisor 822 000, and then standard rounding turns the resulting quotients
into the desired seat numbers. This is to say that each 822 000 citizens of the Union
are alloted about one seat. No quotient must be rounded beyond 90, though, so that
together with the six fixed seats the end result complies with the prespecified ceiling
of 96 seats. The sole exception of this type is Germany.3
Exhibit 1 summarizes the results. The population-per-seat ratios turn out to be of an
over-all degressive nature, though the rigid notion of AFCO-degressivity is not met.
The last column displays the deviations, per Member State, of the decreed AFCO + 1
seat allocation relative to the citizen-based Fix + Prop. apportionment. Except for
Germany and Malta who are curtailed by the maximum and minimum requirements,
there emerges a noticeable systematic tendency. Larger and smaller states incur a
deficit, while medium-sized states enjoy a surplus. For instance, France loses 11 percent
of their Fix + Prop.-seats, Sweden gains 18 percent, Luxembourg loses 14 percent.4
The Fix + Prop. apportionment heeds the democratic principle of electoral equality,
separately for the two groups of subjects that constitute the Union. Citizens are
treated equally by granting about one seat per each 822 000 citizens, and states are
treated equally through guaranteeing six seats per citizenry. The one-person-one-vote
principle underlying proportional representation is, of course, rather abstract. After
all, we are not all equal. In fact, we are proud to be unequal, as is nowhere testified
more convincingly than in the debates of the European Parliament. Yet the ideal of
equality, as a principium, a first and guiding democratic element, has stood the test of
time.
3 The divisor 822 000 ensures that the resulting seat numbers exhaust the target size 589. Any other
value between 821 703 and 822 041 would do just well. — Standard rounding rounds to the nearest
whole number, that is, quotients are rounded up (or down) according as their fractional parts are
larger (or smaller) than one half. — For Germany, we get 82 438 000/822 000 = 100.3→ 90.
4 France: 83 Fix+Prop.-seats minus 11 percent (9) yield 74 AFCO+1-seats.
Sweden: 17 Fix+Prop.-seats plus 18 percent (3) yield 20 AFCO+1-seats.
Luxembourg: 7 Fix+Prop.-seats minus 14 percent (1) yield 6 AFCO+1-seats.
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5. The Jagiellonian Compromise
The ideal of equality is also the guiding principle for the Jagiellonian Compromise
voting system in the Council of Ministers. Since the Council comprises delegates from
governments that, in turn, derive their power from the people, citizens take part in
Council decisions only indirectly. Moreover, decision making in the Council concerns
not just one decision, but many. The process thus differs from plain proportional
representation, yet it, too, must answer to democratic ideals. The Jagiellonian
Compromise is distinguished by being citizen-based, in that its derivation starts out
from the ideal of equality among citizens, to then trace their indirect contributions to
frequent decision making by their government delegates in the Council.
The transition from qualitative-normative ideals to quantitative-operational rules is
always a challenge. The goal cannot be but modest, to investigate and classify
procedures how close they come to meet ideals. As a result we find that the procedures
in use have a top-down format, being imposed on the people with plenty of ad hoc
components, so characteristic of the AFCO + 1 seat allocation for Parliament as well
as of the Double Majority voting system for the Council. In contrast, the Fix + Prop.
seat apportionment as well as the Jagiellonian Compromise demonstrably flow from a
bottom-up design, justifying political power from a citizen-based starting point.
In the Jagiellonian Compromise voting system every Member State is assigned a voting
weight, the root of its population figure (rounded to the nearest whole number). For an
act to be adopted, the total of the voting weights of the supporting states must reach
or surpass a certain quota. The Jagiellonian Compromise comes with a simple quota
formula, the quota is half of the root of the Union’s population plus half of the sum of
all voting weights (rounded to the nearest whole number). The essential characteristic
is a state’s decision power, giving the share of constellations where the vote is decisive.
In the Jagiellonian Compromise these relative decision powers happen to coincide with
the percentage voting weights and thus are found very easily.
Exhibit 2 summarizes the results, using the same population figures as Exhibit 1. For
instance, the Jagiellonian Compromise assigns Sweden a voting weight of 3 008, which
gives her a relative decision power of 3.14 percent. This indicates that Sweden’s vote
will be decisive about twice as often as that of Latvia (1.58), and almost half as often
as that of Poland (6.44). For the Double Majority voting system, whereby an act is
adopted if carried by at least 55 percent of the Member States representing 65 percent
of the Union’s population, the decision powers are more cumbersome to calculate and
are taken from S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007). The last column displays the
deviations of the Double Majority system relative to the citizen-based Jagiellonian
Compromise. Again we recognize a systematic tendency. Now it is the medium-sized
states that incur a deficit, while the larger and the smaller states enjoy a surplus. For
instance, France has 9 percent more power than under the Jagiellonian Compromise,
Sweden 16 percent less, Luxembourg 124 percent more.5
5 France: 8.27 JC power plus 9 percent (0.74) gives 9.02 DM power.
Sweden: 3.14 JC power minus 16 percent (0.50) gives 2.63 DM power.
Luxembourg: 0.71 JC power plus 124 percent (0.88) gives 1.58 DM power.
The inaccuracies are due to rounding the percentage deviations in Exhibit 2 to whole numbers.
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The Jagiellonian Compromise visibly starts out from the citizens, by deriving from the
population figures via their roots the voting weights and decision powers of the Member
States. The exceptional value of the system comes to bear only when returning to
citizens and asking, what the decision power share of a citizen amounts to. According
to a famous result of Penrose (1946), the individual power share is obtained by dividing
the decision power of a state by the root of its population. For the Jagiellonian
Compromise these individual shares are all identical. Therefore the system is such
that it offers all citizens in the Union the same power share to (indirectly) contribute
to the Council’s decisions. Thus the Jagiellonian Compromise realizes a powerful, but
at the same time rather sophisticated idealization of democratic equality.
The derivation of these results may be found in the seminal monograph of Felsen-
thal/Machover (1998), a quick outline is given by Kirsch (2001). Felsenthal/Machover
(2001) proposed a quota in the vicinity of 60 percent, later confirmed by a simulation
study of Chang et al. (2006). The quota formula is due to Z˙yczkowski/S lomczyn´ski
(2004), S lomczyn´ski/Z˙yczkowski (2006). The idealizations underlying this approach
may of course be questioned, as in the informative succession of the Moberg (2002),
Hosli/Machover (2004), Moberg (2007) papers. Our answer would be, not that the
ideal of democratic equality must necessarily lead to the Jagiellonian Compromise,
but that this system has sufficiently many virtues to match the ideal remarkably well.
6. Conclusion
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers count among the core
institutions of the European Union. As of now, the AFCO + 1 seat allocation in
Parliament and the Double Majority voting system in the Council are negotiated ad hoc
procedures. For both institutions there are citizen-based alternatives, the Fix + Prop.
seat apportionment for Parliament, and the Jagiellonian Compromise system for the
Council. A replacement of the ad hoc procedures by citizen-based methods naturally
entails some shift of parliamentary seats, and some shift of decision power.
By calculating the percentage deviations of the enacted old procedures relative to the
envisioned new methods, as in the last columns in Exhibits 1 and 2, changes are put
on the same scale and become comparable. Large and small states lose in the first
setting and gain in the second, and medium-sized states gain in the first and lose in
the second. Surprisingly, the changes balance out almost perfectly. See Exhibit 3.
For those who do want to stay put this provides a striking argument to defend
the status quo. Why should dedicated parliamentarists comfort themselves that
modifications they endure are compensated by changes in the Council? Why should
staunch governmentalists commit themselves to alterations that are being outweighed
in Parliament with whom they have few dealings?
Fortunately, the argument is even more striking for the political elite who wants to
move ahead. A transition to citizen-based procedures would relegate any purported old
rivalries between European institutions in favor of a new alliance, around the Union’s
citizens as the common denominator. The shifts of seats and power would seem to fade
away compared to the significant gain in democratic substance, of putting citizens first.
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Appendix. Alternative apportionment methods
The envisioned Fix + Prop. apportionment for the European Parliament and the
Jagiellonian Compromise for the Council of Ministers are just two prototypes, out
of infinitely many citizen-based representation schemes and voting systems. In
this appendix we delineate a few alternatives, with a particular view to what has
accumulated in the literature. Reviews how the European Parliament came into being
and which problems had to be dealt with are provided, for example, by Silvestro (1990),
Bocklet (1992), Hovehne (1999), and Puntscher-Rieckmann et al. (2003).
For voting systems, variations around the quorum formula might be a possibility to
adjust certain characteristics such as blocking power or the like, if so desired. Much
of this is discussed elsewhere in this Proceedings volume. A continuous transition
from full proportionality in Parliament to the square root weighting for the Council, is
accomplished by noticing that population figures enter into the calculations just with
different exponents. In the first instance the exponent is one, in the second, one half.
To our knowledge Theil/Schrage (1977) are the first to consider exponents ranging from
zero (equal weights) through one half (root weights) and one (full proportionality) to
three (cube law). The transformation was re-discovered by Anders Hagelberg during
the 2000 Nice summit (Moberg, 2007), and Ramı´rez-Gonza´lez et al. (2006).
We believe that for the purpose of representing citizens in parliament no exponent
distinct from one is acceptable. Otherwise the system re-weighs citizens, and any
weighting of citizens conflicts with the democratic one-person-one-vote principle. For
this reason we have concentrated on such apportionment methods as Fix + Prop. that
stay within the realm of equity, by safeguarding the identities of the citizenries of every
Member States and by treating all citizens as being equal. This Janus-faced approach
has a long tradition, earlier references being Kundoch (1976) and Wessels (1990) for its
application to the European Parliament, or Moberg (1998) for its use in the Council.
Scheffler (2005, p. 80) discusses two variants of Fix + Prop. type systems. He
recommends the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague¨), and
mentions the divisor method with rounding down (Jefferson/D’Hondt/Hagenbach-
Bischoff) as an alternative. However, if anything the D’Hondt method is not degressive
but progressive, in the sense that it is calculably biased in favor of larger and at the
expense of smaller participants. For the current data it would transfer seven seats
from smaller to larger Member States as compared to the results in Exhibit 1. During
the deliberations of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the D’Hondt variant was
tabled by the German CDU delegation, but eventually withdrawn. In the plenum
speakers took pleasure to teach the Germans a lesson that when degressivity is sought,
the answer cannot be D’Hondt.6
6 The German delegates presumably acted in good faith by trusting their Federal Constitutional
Court, the only institution of any renown unable to recognize any systematic difference between the
divisor methods with rounding down (Jefferson/D’Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischoff) and with standard
rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague¨). Other German courts do declare the D’Hondt apportionments
to be unlawfully non-proportional when its apportionment deviates from the Sainte-Lague¨ result
(Pukelsheim/Maier, 2006, fn. 18). The heterogeneity in just one Member State may serve as an
indication how big a challenge it is for all 27 to move towards electoral homogeneity.
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The divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague¨) comes closest to
meeting the one-person-one-vote principle, in view of its many virtues distinguishing it
over alternative procedures (Balinski/Young, 1982b). Amongst others it is unbiased,
so that on average every citizenry receives the share of seats to which it is entitled by
the size of its population.
In case the European Parliament wants to move away from unbiasedness in order to
push degressivity, the divisor method with rounding up (Adams) may be invoked. This
method is biased in the opposite direction of D’Hondt, favoring smaller Member States
at the expense of larger states. This is plainly visible when the Sainte-Lague¨ results are
compared with the Adams apportionment. For instance, between the third and fourth
column in Exhibit 4, five seats are transferred from larger to smaller Member States,
between the next two columns, six. The divisor method with rounding up (Adams) has
been used by the French legislator to apportion the seats of the Assemble´e Nationale
among the De´partments (Balinski, 2004, p. 190).
In Exhibit 4, the columns labeled “6+Std” and “6+Up” show the apportionments of
the (unbiased) divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague¨), and
the (degressively biased) divisor method with rounding up (Adams), with a base of
six fixed seats. With the Adams method, every citizenry gets always at least one seat
automatically, whence the fixed base seats could be lowered from six to five. The
results are given in the columns with headers “5+Std” and “5+Up” of Exhibit 4. The
four apportionments of the 751 seats display a clear trend. From left to right, larger
Member States lose seats and smaller Member States gain seats.
Among the apportionments of Exhibit 4 the one that is closest to the AFCO + 1
allocation is the “parabolic” allotment (Ramı´rez-Gonza´lez et al. 2006; Ramı´rez-
Gonza´lez 2007). The parabolic method is a workable operational approach to the
normative idea of degressive proportionality. The functioning and the implementation
of the method requires a more elaborate mathematical apparatus, with the implied
challenge of communicating parabolicity to the wider public. These examples are not
an exhaustive enumeration, many other mathematically sound procedures are feasible
(Maier/Pukelsheim, 2007). The decision which to implement is up to the lawmaker.
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Allocation of European Parliament seats to Member States:
Citizen-based apportionment method “Fix + Prop.” and
negotiated ad hoc allocation “AFCO + 1”
Member States Population Fix + Prop. Popul. per AFCO + 1 Popul. per Deviation
EU-27 2007 [Divisor 822 000] Fix+Prop. 2009–2014 AFCO+1 [in %]
Germany 82 438 000 6 + 90 = 96 858 729 96 858 729 0
France 62 886 200 6 + 77 = 83 757 665 74 849 814 −11
United Kingdom 60 421 900 6 + 74 = 80 755 274 73 827 697 −9
Italy 58 751 700 6 + 71 = 77 *763 009 73 804 818 −5
Spain 43 758 300 6 + 53 = 59 741 666 54 *810 339 −8
Poland 38 157 100 6 + 46 = 52 733 790 51 748 178 −2
Romania 21 610 200 6 + 26 = 32 675 319 33 654 855 +3
Netherlands 16 334 200 6 + 20 = 26 628 238 26 628 238 0
Greece 11 125 200 6 + 14 = 20 556 260 22 505 691 +10
Portugal 10 569 600 6 + 13 = 19 *556 295 22 480 436 +16
Belgium 10 511 400 6 + 13 = 19 553 232 22 477 791 +16
Czech Republic 10 251 100 6 + 12 = 18 *569 506 22 465 959 +22
Hungary 10 076 600 6 + 12 = 18 559 811 22 458 027 +22
Sweden 9 047 800 6 + 11 = 17 532 224 20 452 390 +18
Austria 8 265 900 6 + 10 = 16 516 619 19 435 047 +19
Bulgaria 7 718 800 6 + 9 = 15 514 587 18 428 822 +20
Denmark 5 427 500 6 + 7 = 13 417 500 13 417 500 0
Slovak Republic 5 389 200 6 + 7 = 13 414 554 13 414 554 0
Finland 5 255 600 6 + 6 = 12 *437 967 13 404 277 +8
Ireland 4 209 000 6 + 5 = 11 382 636 12 350 750 +9
Lithuania 3 403 300 6 + 4 = 10 340 330 12 283 608 +20
Latvia 2 294 600 6 + 3 = 9 254 956 9 254 956 0
Slovenia 2 003 400 6 + 2 = 8 250 425 8 250 425 0
Estonia 1 344 700 6 + 2 = 8 168 088 6 224 117 −25
Cyprus 766 400 6 + 1 = 7 109 486 6 127 733 −14
Luxembourg 459 500 6 + 1 = 7 65 643 6 76 583 −14
Malta 404 300 6 + 0 = 6 67 383 6 67 383 0
Total 492 881 500 162+589 = 751 751
Exhibit 1. The population data are those underlying the European Council’s qualified
majority voting system in 2007, see Steinmeier (2007). The Fix + Prop. apportionment
gives 6 seats to the citizenry of each Member State, and assigns the remaining 589
seats in proportion to populations. To this end the population figures are divided by
a common divisor, 822 000, and the resulting fractional numbers are rounded to the
nearest whole number. For instance, France receives 62 886 200/822 000 = 76.504 →
77 + 6 = 83 seats. The AFCO + 1 column displays the seat allocation enacted for
the 2009–2014 legislative period. Its deviation from the Fix + Prop. apportionment
is found, for instance for France, to be (74 − 83)/83 = −0.1084 → −11 percent.
Population-per-seat ratios are decreasing except for slight disturbances marked *.
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Qualified majority voting systems for the Council of Ministers:
Citizen-based Jagiellonian Compromise “JC” and
negotiated ad hoc Double Majority “DM”
Member States Population JC JC DM Deviation
EU-27 2007 Weight Power Power [in %]
Germany 82 438 000 9 080 9.46 11.66 +23
France 62 886 200 7 930 8.27 9.02 +9
United Kingdom 60 421 900 7 773 8.10 8.69 +7
Italy 58 751 700 7 665 7.99 8.49 +6
Spain 43 758 300 6 615 6.90 6.55 −5
Poland 38 157 100 6 177 6.44 5.71 −11
Romania 21 610 200 4 649 4.85 4.15 −14
Netherlands 16 334 200 4 042 4.21 3.50 −17
Greece 11 125 200 3 335 3.48 2.88 −17
Portugal 10 569 600 3 251 3.39 2.80 −17
Belgium 10 511 400 3 242 3.38 2.80 −17
Czech Republic 10 251 100 3 202 3.34 2.77 −17
Hungary 10 076 600 3 174 3.31 2.74 −17
Sweden 9 047 800 3 008 3.14 2.63 −16
Austria 8 265 900 2 875 3.00 2.53 −16
Bulgaria 7 718 800 2 778 2.90 2.47 −15
Denmark 5 427 500 2 330 2.43 2.19 −10
Slovak Republic 5 389 200 2 321 2.42 2.18 −10
Finland 5 255 600 2 293 2.39 2.17 −9
Ireland 4 209 000 2 052 2.14 2.04 −5
Lithuania 3 403 300 1 845 1.92 1.95 +2
Latvia 2 294 600 1 515 1.58 1.81 +15
Slovenia 2 003 400 1 415 1.47 1.78 +21
Estonia 1 344 700 1 160 1.21 1.69 +40
Cyprus 766 400 875 0.91 1.63 +79
Luxembourg 459 500 678 0.71 1.59 +124
Malta 404 300 636 0.66 1.58 +139
Total 492 881 500 95 916 100.00 100.00
Quota 59 058 61.57
Exhibit 2. The voting weights of the Jagiellonian Compromise are the roots of the
population figures, rounded to the nearest whole number. Thus Malta enjoys weight√
404 300 = 635.9 → 636. The quota for a qualified majority decision obeys the formula
(
√
492 881 500 + 95 916)/2 = 59 058.47 → 59 058 (bottom line). This particular rule
is such that percentage weights and decision powers coincide. Since Malta’s weight
amounts to 636/95 916 = 0.006631 → 0.66 percent, its relative Penrose/Banzhaf
power index is the same, 0.66. The power indices for the Double Majority rule, of 55
percent of the Member States and 65 percent of the Union’s population, are taken from
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007). Its deviation from the Jagiellonian Compromise
is found, for instance for Malta, to be (1.58− 0.66)/0.66 = +1.3939 → +139 percent.
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Allocation of European Parliament seats to Member States:
Apportionments of four variants “base + divide & round”,
of the parabolic allotment, and of “AFCO + 1”
Member States Population 5+Std 5+Up 6+Std 6+Up para- AFCO
EU-27 2007 [786 000] [800 000] [822 000] [845 000] bolic +1
Germany 82 438 000 96 96 96 96 96 96
France 62 886 200 85 84 83 81 79 74
United Kingdom 60 421 900 82 81 80 78 76 73
Italy 58 751 700 80 79 77 76 75 73
Spain 43 758 300 61 60 59 58 59 54
Poland 38 157 100 54 53 52 52 53 51
Romania 21 610 200 32 33 32 32 34 33
Netherlands 16 334 200 26 26 26 26 27 26
Greece 11 125 200 19 19 20 20 20 22
Portugal 10 569 600 18 19 19 19 20 22
Belgium 10 511 400 18 19 19 19 20 22
Czech Republic 10 251 100 18 18 18 19 19 22
Hungary 10 076 600 18 18 18 18 19 22
Sweden 9 047 800 17 17 17 17 18 20
Austria 8 265 900 16 16 16 16 17 19
Bulgaria 7 718 800 15 15 15 16 16 18
Denmark 5 427 500 12 12 13 13 13 13
Slovak Republic 5 389 200 12 12 13 13 13 13
Finland 5 255 600 12 12 12 13 13 13
Ireland 4 209 000 10 11 11 11 11 12
Lithuania 3 403 300 9 10 10 11 10 12
Latvia 2 294 600 8 8 9 9 9 9
Slovenia 2 003 400 8 8 8 9 8 8
Estonia 1 344 700 7 7 8 8 7 6
Cyprus 766 400 6 6 7 7 7 6
Luxembourg 459 500 6 6 7 7 6 6
Malta 404 300 6 6 6 7 6 6
Total 492 881 500 135 + 616 = 751 162 + 589 = 751 751 751
Exhibit 4. The method 5+Std guarantees each Member State’s citizenry 5 seats, and
assigns the remaining 616 seats using the divisor method with standard rounding.
Thus, with divisor 786 000 as in the header, France receives 62 886 000/786 000 =
80.01 → 80 + 5 = 85 seats. The method 5+Up is similar, but always rounds up.
Now France gets 62 886 000/800 000 = 78.61 ↑ 79 + 5 = 84 seats. The methods 6+Std
(elsewhere called Fix + Prop.) and 6+Up use a base of 6 seats per citizenry, with
589 seats for proportional apportionment. The parabolic allotment is from Ramı´rez-
Gonza´lez (2007). The AFCO+1 allocation has been adopted for the period 2009–2014.
In essence, from left to right, larger states lose seats and smaller states gain seats.
